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ABSTRACT
The U. S. market for homes appears riot to be efficient.A number of
information variables predict housing price changes and excess returns of
housing relative to debt over the succeeding year.Price changes observed
over one year tend to continue for one more year in the same direction.
Construction cost divided by price, the change in per capita real income,
the change in adult population are all positively related to price changes
or excess returns over the subsequent year.
The results are based on time-series cross section regressions with
quarterly data 1970-1 to 1987-3 and for cities Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and
San Francisco.
Karl E. Case Robert J. Shiller
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Weflesley College Cowles Foundation
Wellesley, MA 02181 Yale Foundation
Box 2125 Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520In an earlier paper [Case and Shiller, 1989] we performed
weak-form tests of the efficiency of the market for single family
homes.The tests were based on a set of price indexes
constructed from micro data on nearly 40,000 homes that were sold
more than once during the period 1970-1986 in fourmetropolitan
areas: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco (Alameda
County).
In that paper we found evidence of positive serial
correlation in real housing prices.A change in the log real
price index in a given year and a given city tends to be followed
by a change in the same direction the following year between 25
percent and 50 percent as large.We also found evidence of
inertia in a crude measure of excess returns estimated for each
of the four metropolitan areas.
This paper takes the analysis several steps further.First,
we construct a more detailed estimate of excess returns to
investment in single family homes in each of the four cities that
is sensitive to changes in the market value of housing services
and to changes in marginal personal income tax rates.Second, we
perform strong-form efficiency tests by exploring the
forecastability of excess returns and house prices with a number
of forecasting variables.
The WRS Index
The biggest problem faced by analysts of the residential
real estate market is a lack of good time series on house prices.
The most commonly used series is the National Association of
1Realtors' "median price of existing single family homes."While
the MAR generates this series for a large number of metropolitan
areas quarterly and for the U.S as a whole monthly, they are not
useful for our purposes.First, they are only available since
1981.Second, changes in the median home price in an area depend
both on changes in house prices and on changes in the mix of
homes that happens to sell.
In an earlier piece (Case and Shiller [19871) we discuss
the problems associated with the MAR data and construct an
alternative based on microdata using a technique that we call the
Weighted Repeat Sales (WRS) method.The method used is a
modification of one first proposed by Bailey, Muth and Nourse
[1963) (hereafter BMN).The method uses observations on
individual houses that sold more than once during the sample
period.Specifically, the change in log price for each
observation is regressed on a set of simple dummy variables.The
duinmys are set to -1 for the period of the first sale and to +1
for the period of the second sale and to 0 otherwise.The
resulting coefficients are the values of the log price index
(WRS).Sally, Muth and Nourse argued that if individual log
house price changes differed from the city-wide log house price
changes by an independent, identically distributed noise term,
the BMN method produces the best linear unbiased estimate of the
city-wide log price index.
In our earlier piece we argue that the house-specific
component of the change in log price is not likely to be
2homoscedastic, but that the variance of the error is likely to
increase with the interval between sales.Specifically we
assumed that the log price P of the ith house at time t is:
(1)
where C is the log of the city-wide level of housing prices at
time t, H is a Gaussian random walk (where AH has zero mean and
variance ah2) that is uncorrelated with CT and HJT for all P and
andN is an identically distributed normal noise term
(which has zero mean and variance UN2) and is uncorrelated with
CT and HJT for all jandT and with NJT unless i=jandt=T
In equation (1)N11 represents the truly random component of
sales prices around true value resulting from random events in
the search process, the behavior of real estate agents and other
imperfections.H1 represents the individual drift in house value
through time.
These assumptions led us to a three step weighted
(generalized) least squares procedure.The BMN procedure was
followed precisely in the first step, and the residuals were
stored. The squared residuals from the first step regression were
then used as the dependent variable in a second step with a
constant term and the time interval between sales on the right
hand side.1The constant term is the estimate of UN2, and the
1Observations in which the time interval between sales is
larger are likely to have larger errors.As a result, we used a
weighted regression that downweighted the observations
corresponding to large time intervals.As we mentioned in the
text, the regression was run separately for each quarter using
only information available in that quarter.For earlier quarters
that meant that the coefficients were calculated with only a
3coefficient on the time variable is the estimate of a.In the
third step, the first step was repeated after first dividing each
observation by the square root of the fitted value in the second
stage regression.
The above procedure was used to create two log price
indexes, WRSa and WRSb.In each city, houses were randomly
allocated to two samples, a and b, each with half the available
observations, and the price indexes were estimated separately
with these samples.In our regression results below, WRSa was
used for left-hand (dependent) variables, and WRSb was used for
right-hand (independent) variables.This method was adopted as a
simple expedient to prevent the same measurement error from
contaminating both sides of the equation; See Case and Shiller
[1989].
The Data
Table 1 contains a list of the variables used in
constructing the estimate of excess returns for each metro area
and in the forecasting equations later in the paper. Most of the
variables and their sources listed in Table 1 are self
explanatory.Two, however, deserve some discussion: RENTINDEX, a
metro area specific rent index, and MTR, a national marginal
individual income tax rate series.
A critical component of the return to investment in owner
small number of observations.In instances where the estimated
coefficient of the interval between sales has the wrong sign, it
was set to zero, and the procedure reduces to OLS in step three.
4Table 1
VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
All Variables are Quarterly
1970:1 to 1986:2
CODE SERIES SOURCE
RENT CPI-RESIDENTIAL BLS -MonthlyLabor Review,
INDEXRENT INDEX adjusted to estimate mid—
(For each metro area) quarter
CPI CONSUMER PRICE INDEX BLS -DataResources, Inc.
ALL ITEMS -URBAN
NMTG EFFECTIVE MORTGAGE
RATE -EXISTINGHOMESFederal Reserve System -
(CONVENTIONAL) Data Resources, Inc.
EMP EMPLOYMENT, NON-AGRI.
WAGE AND SALARY Data Resources, Inc.
(For each metro area) Monthly Labor Review
INCTOTPERSONAL INCOME Data Resources, Inc.
(For each metro area) Survey of Current Business
PTAX EFFECTIVE PROPERTY Constructed from Census
TAX RATE —Residentialof Governments and studies
(For each metro area) by the District of Columbia
as reported annually in the
Statistical Abstract of the
United States
POP POPULATION Data Resources, Inc.
(For each metro area) Current Population Survey
AGE1 PERCENT OF POPULATION Data Resources, Inc.
BETWEEN 25 AND 34 Dept. of Commerce, Bureau
(For each Metro area) of the Census, "State
Population and Household
Estimates"
AGE2 PERCENT OF POPULATION
BETWEEN 35 AND 44 Same as above
(For each metro area)
5VARIABLES CONTINUED:
CODE SERIES SOURCE
AGEPOP NtThBER OF PERSONS
BETWEEN 25 AND 44
(For each metro area)
HSTARTSHOUSING STARTS -
SINGLEFAMILY
(For each metro area)
TBILL
MTR
INTEREST RATE ON 90-
DAY TREASURY BILLS
MARGINALINDIVIDUAL









Dept. of Commerce Series
C-25
Economic Report of the
President
Joint Center for Housing
Studies, Harvard University
Provided by D. Dipasquale
and W. Apgar
Engineering News Recordoccupied housing is the value of housing services thataccrues to
owners.This "imputed rent" is in essence the dividend component
of the return.Since there are no transactions involved, this
component of the yield must be estimated and is problematic.
The only measures of rent available on a consistent basis for
specific metropolitan areas is the "residential rent" component
of the Consumer Price Index produced by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.In constructing the index, the BLS repeatedly
surveys the same units from year to year to control for quality.
A number of authors [Lowry (1982), Apgar (1987), DiPasquale and
Wheaton (1989)) have criticized the index because it ignores the
depreciation that takes place over time and thus tends to
underestimate the level of rents controlling for unit quality.
Some of the observed decline in real rents observed during the
1970's can be attributed to this downward bias.The BLS last
year acknowledged the problem and introduced a correction into
the index beginning in 1988.However, no changes were made in
the historical series. Some of the authors critical of the
series have suggested increasing rents annually from0.5 to 0.9
percent [see again Lowry (1982), Apgar (1987) and DiPasquale and
Wheaton (1989)].
For purposes of constructing an index of returns to
homeowners, the unadjusted index that fails to adjust for
depreciation is the appropriate one.It is reasonable to assume
that owner occupied housing depreciates physicallyover time at
about the same rate as rental housing with appropriate
7expenditures on maintenance and repair.The WRS index discussed
above is based on repeat sales of the same unit. An individual
home—owner will find that the market value of the housing
services that he/she consumes declines slightly with the age of
the unit as will the market value of the unit itself. Since this
small decline is part of the net yield to owners, we do not
adjust the BLS rent index nor do we attempt to wash depreciation
out of our WRS index for purposes of estimating excess returns to
investment.
Clearly, the decision to invest in owner occupied
housing is likely to be influenced by the tax treatment of its
yield.This has changed in complicated ways over time. First of
all, net imputed rent has never been subject to taxation.
Second, property tax payments and mortgage interest payments have
always been deductible.The value of a deduction, of course,
depends on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
The recent tax acts, specifically ERTA in 1981 and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, have changed the tax system in fairly
dramatic ways.The change that has had the most significant
direct effect on owner occupied housing has been the sharp
decline in marginal tax rates, particularly at the top end.
The most significant indirect effect has come through the
dramatic changes in depreciation rules, the ITC, and changes in
passive loss rules that worked in favor of rental housing during
the early 1980's and against it in the late 1980's.
8To calculate excess returns to investment in owneroccupied
housing, a time series on an appropriate marginal tax rate is
needed.The marginal tax rate series used was constructed by the
researchers at the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard.
It was constructed by looking at the income profile of first time
home buyers and calculating the average marginal rate, given the
laws in effect in each year, for that group.The argument for
using first time home buyers is that they can be thought ofas
the "marginal" investors.Those with higher incomes face higher
marginal rates and will earn higher excess returns.Higher tax
rates mean a lower opportunity cost of capital and lower net
property taxes and mortgage payments.
It is important to note that both the rent series and the
marginal tax rate series chosen will result in conservative
estimates of excess returns.
Estimating Excess Returns
Two basic approaches were taken to estimating excess returns.
The first assumes that the home is bought outright,no
leveraging.The second assumes the purchase is financed withan
80% mortgage.Both are after—tax rates of return, and they












The WRS index is defined above, andRENTINDEX, PTAX, MTR
and NMTG are defined in Table 1.Ofcritical importance are
PRICE7O, the base period houseprice, and RENT7O, the base period
value for imputed rent. Thederivation of PRICE7O and RENT7O is
shown in Table 2.The baseline house price i-sassumed to be the
median value of owner occupied unitsfrom the 1970 Census.The
figures are available separately foreach of the four SMSA's.
For the Alameda County series, weused the San Francisco/Oakland
SMSA.
Estimating baseline imputed rent was not as easy.While
median contract rent (which excludesutility payments) is
available for each SMSA, rental units on averageare smaller and
of lower quality than owneroccupied units.Thus, median rent
will understate the market value ofthe housing services
generated by the median owneroccupied house.A rough correction
was thus made to rentbased on the number of rooms.The Census
has data on the median number of roomsin renter occupied and
owner occupied housingunits and the median rent for eachcity
was simply stepped upin proportion to the larger numberof rooms












Sources: 1.U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and
Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census,
1970 Census of Housing, Vol. 1, Parts 7,12, 15, 45, Tables 1
and 14.Data are for Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas.










































11The right hand coluanintable 2k shows the estimated
baselineannual rentasfraction of the median home value.
Compared to the averaqe dividend price ratIo on commonstocks,
those numbers look highs but they are notunreasonable.
Tables 3 and 4 present the calculations for excessreturns
to investeert in owner occupied housing (EXCESSAand EXCESS5)
Table 3 presents the figures assuming that theproperty was
purchasedoutright (EXCESS)Table 4assumesthat the
investment wasleveraged with an SOpercent mortgage at the going
rateof interest (EXCESS5).
Thetables confirm the conventional wisdom thathousing was
an exceptional investment throughoutthe decade othe l97cain
allcltiecItshould be kept in mind thatthese estimates are
fairlyconsanat ireThe marginal income tax rate series and the
rantprice indexboth are, if anything downward biased.Only
the baseline imputed rent figureisat all suspectend it coul4
behalved andthese series would show extraordinary excess
returns.
Asexpected the highest returns are achieved inCalifornia
andTexasduring their respective price booms. The Dallas boom
occurred in 1977-19, while the California boom waslonger,
starting in 1978and running into early 1980.Inboth Dallas and
Oakland, leveraged returns of over 100percentper yearwere
12Table 3
ESTIMATED EXCESS RETURNSFORFOUR QUARTERS





1970.1 . . . .
70.2 . . . .
70.3 . . . .
70.4 . . . .
1971.1 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.09
71.2 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.11
71.3 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.14
71.4 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.06
1972.1 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.10
72.2 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.11
72.3 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10
72.4 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.12
1973.1 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11
73.2 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.10
73.3 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.15
73.4 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.14
1974.1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15
74.2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.15
74.3 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.10
74.4 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.12
1975.1 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.13
75.2 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.11
75.3 •0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11
75.4 —0.04 0.08 0.09 0.12
1976.1 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.14
76.2 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.17
76.3 —0.02 0.10 0.06 0.18
76.4 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.20
1977.1 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.27
77.2 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.32
77.3 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.33
77.4 0.04 0.18 0.21 0.29
1978.1 0.09 0.19 0.22 0.22
78.2 0.08 0.20 0.22 0.16
78.3 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.10
78.4 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.14
1979.1 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.09
79.2 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.16
79.3 0.19 0.07 0.23 0.20
79.4 0.19 0.05 0.15 0.16
1980.1 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.25
80.2 0.10 —0.03 0.14 0.16
80.3 0.07 —0.03 0.12 0.14
80.4 0.03 —0.06 0.13 0.12
13YEAR ATLANTACHICAGODALLASSANFRAN
1981.1 0.02 —0.06 0.08 0.09
81.2 0.05 —0.01 0.07 0.10
81.3 0.04 —0.03 0.05 0.04
81.4 0.00 —0.06 0.00 —0.05
1982.1 —0.03 —0.09 0.00 —0.09
82.2 —0.04 —0.12 0.00 —0.07
82.3 —0.03 —0.05 0.01 —0.09
82.4 0.03 —0.01 0.04 —0.02
1983.1 —0.01 —0.01 0.01 —0.05
83.2 0.03 0.01 0.04 —0.05
83.3 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.02
83.4 0.04 —0.01 0.07 0.03
1984.1 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.04
84.2 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02
84.3 0.03 —0.04 0.05 0.02
84.4 0.08 —0.01 0.07 0.03
1985.1 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.03
85.2 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04
85.3 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07
85.4 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.07
1986.1 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08
14Table 4
ESTIMATEDEXCESS RETURNSFOR FOUR QUARTERS
ENDINGINEACH QUARTER: 1971-1986
(EXCESSB --ASSUMING80% MORTGAGE)





1971.1 0.42 0.28 0.42 0.41
71.2 0.39 0.06 0.47 0.49
71.3 0.79 0.13 0.39 0.65
71.4 0.13 0.28 0.73 0.21
1972.1 0.51 0.29 0.78 0.38
72.2 0.39 0.42 0.19 0.46
72.3 0.28 0.38 0.30 0.41
72.4 0.34 0.44 0.41 0.47
1973.1 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.40
73.2 0.68 0.46 0.72 0.41
73.3 0.51 0.40 0.67 0.65
73.4 0.61 0.39 0.05 0.63
1974.1 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.70
74.2 0.43 0.36 0.37 0.71
74.3 0.43 0.34 0.18 0.50
74.4 0.49 0.25 0.51 0.58
1975.1 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.59
75.2 —0.02 0.27 0.39 0.54
75.3 0.06 0.21 0.37 0.55
75.4 —0.28 0.34 0.39 0.53
1976.1 0.01 0.37 0.11 0.59
76.2 —0.01 0.41 0.11 0.75
76.3 —0.21 0.44 0.19 0.80
76.4 0.11 0.36 0.18 0.89
1977.1 0.19 0.43 0.64 1.22
77.2 0.16 0.52 0.66 1.46
77.3 0.31 0.56 0.70 1.54
77.4 0.06 0.76 0.92 1.33
1978.1 0.31 0.82 0.96 0.97
78.2 0.26 0.87 0.99 0.68
78.3 0.24 0.85 1.03 0.41
78.4 0.40 0.71 1.09 0.61
1979.1 0.55 0.56 1.30 0.35
79.2 0.66 0.43 1.04 0.69
79.3 0.89 0.28 1.08 0.91
79.4 0.89 0.23 0.73 0.76
1980.1 0.52 —0.01 0.60 1.24
80.2 0.46 —0.18 0.69 0.77
80.3 0.32 —0.19 0.55 0.65
80.4 0.16 —0.30 0.64 0.63
15YEAR ATLANTACHICAGODALLAS SAN FRAN
1981.1 0.13 —0.29 0.40 0.46
81.2 0.13 —0.17 0.21 0.34
81.3 0.09 —0.24 0.14 0.12
81.4 0.03 —0.29 0.02 —0.22
1982.1 —0.11 —0.40 0.04 —0.41
82.2 —0.13 —0.55 0.06 —0.29
82.3 —0.15 —0.27 0.04 —0.46
82.4 —0.02 —0.18 0.04 —0.27
1983.1 —0.09 —0.09 0.01 —0.32
83.2 0.01 —0.06 0.07 —0.38
83.3 0.03 —0.12 0.18 —0.11
83.4 —0.01 —0.23 0.14 —0.05
1984.1 0.18 —0.14 0.19 0.06
84.2 0.06 —0.10 0.18 —0.05
84.3 0.06 —0.28 0.13 —0.01
84.4 0.26 —0.17 0.23 0.01
1985.1 0.15 —0.09 0.17 0.05
85.2 Q.19 —0.05 0.09 0.15
85.3 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.27
85.4 0.04 0.02 —0.02 0.20
1986.1 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.26
16achieved during those years.Home owners in Chicago and Atlanta
also did extremely well during the 1970's.
Leveraged buyers suffered large percent losses during the
early 1980's in every city but Dallas.Chicago had the longest
string of negative returns from 1980-1984.
Several things can be seen in the raw numbers.First, if
these numbers are correct, and there isno reason to believe that
they are not, it is extraordinary that excess returns of this
magnitude could persist for so long a period of time. In one
sense, we now know a "buy rule" that will consistently earnan
extraordinary return: simply buy housing.The puzzling question
is, why didn't housing pricesrise even further and more rapidly
during the decade?
Second, it is apparent that there is a substantial degree of
positive serial correlation in the data.Positive signs and
negative signs are clumped and there are clear "waves" in the
data.Some of this is, of course, explained by the fact that
these are returns for the previous four quarters estimated with
quarterly data so that the returns periods overlap.In our
earlier paper (Case and Shiller [1989)), however,we concluded
that positive serial correlation goes beyond what is explained by
overlapping intervals.A substantial degree of quarter-to-
quarter noise is still present.
Estimation Procedure
This section attempts to forecast house prices andexcess
returns using a set of forecasting variables.The tables below
17give time—series—cross—Section regression results,pooling the
four cities to reduce standard errors of theestimates.Pooling
the data from the four cities can reducestandard errors because
it increases the number of observations in theregression and
also because it may increase the variance ofindependent
variables by including cross—city variance. The estimated
coefficients are ordinary least squares estimates =(X'XY'X'Y
where the vector I of observations of thedependent variable
equals [11'Y2'13' 14']' where Y is the matrix of dependent
variables for city i, and the matrix X ofobservations of
independent variables equals [X1' X2'X3' X4']' where X1 is the
matrix of independent variables for city i.These are "stacked"
ordinary—least squares regressions, effectively ordinaryleast
squares regressions for each city butconstraining all
coefficients to be the same across cities.The estimated
standard errors of the estimated coefficients take accountof the
overlap in one-year forecasts with quarterly datausing a method
of Hansen and Hodrick [1980] modified to allowtime—series-cross-
section regression.The estimated variance matrix of estimated
coefficients was (X'X1X'SX(X'X)-l and S is an estimated
covariance matrix of the error terms in the ordinary least
squares regression.In composing S it was assumed that
cov(u1,1,u) =c1L(t1—t2)where u1 is the error term for city i at
time t and c1 equals the sample variance of the residuals,
var(Y —X/3)if i =j, andequals the average covariance of
contemporaneous residuals across all pairs of cities if idoes
18not equal j.Thustwo parameters were estimated to compose S.
L(t1—t2) equals 1 -tl—t2/4if t1—t2<4,and zero otherwise,
so that L(t1-t,)is the degree of overlap between the forecast
intervals.
Results
In discussing the results we will often refer to the
"expected" sign of a coefficient.Of course, if markets are
efficient there is no expected sign: all coefficients should be
zero.If, however, information tends to be incorporated with a
lag into housing prices, then the expected sign of a coefficient
may tend to be the same as the expected effect on housing value
of a change in the variable indicated.
We first observe [Table 5] that price changes show the
positive serial correlation at short horizons and negative serial
correlation at longer horizons that has been observed for other
assets (Cutler, Poterba and Summers [1990]) and that is
consistent with notion of "excess volatility" in prices.The
results show that if prices once go up in a given year, they tend
also to go up the next year, but by about a third as much.
Moreover, this upward movement appears partly to be• reversed in
succeeding years, although the negative coefficients are not
statistically significant.
The R2s in Table 5 are not very high.We sought to improve
our forecasting ability by including the otherforecasting
variables, in Table 6.Table 7 uses the forecasting variables to
19Table 5
Regressions of Change in Log Real Price on Its Lagged Values
Dependent Variable is W+5Wat+l
(Walog real price index estimated from a sample of homes)
(Wblog real price index estimated from b sample of homes)
Regression No. 1 2 3 4 5
1Constant 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.015
(1.033) (1.244) (1.354) (1.596) (1.581)
2 W-w 0.312 --- 0.375
btbt-4 (2.863) (3.341)
3 w -w 8 -0.014 --- -0.095
bt-4bt- (-0.120) (-0.911)
4 W -w --- -0.124 --- -1.118
bt-8bt-12 (-1.025) (-1.142)
5 W -W -0.110 -0.029
bt-12bt-16 (-0.895)(-0.283)
0.108 0.000 0.018 0.014 0.162
Nobs 229 213 197 181 181
Note: t-statistics (in parentheses) take account of overlap of observations
of dependent variable and cross-section-time-series structure of data.
Data are quarterly starting in 1970, first quarter.Data end in 1986,

































Regresslans of Prico Change on Forecasting Variables
Dependent Variable is WattsWst+i




























































a2 0.356 0.361 0.329 0.009 0.163
fobs 229 229 229 229 229
21Table 7
Regressions of Excess Return A (No Leverage) on ForecastingVariables
Dependent Variable is EXCESS from t+l to t+5
Aa
Regression No. 1 2 (dummied) 3 4 5
IConst 0.034 0.163 -0.126 -0.037 -0.159






3RENT -1.876 -1.848 1.657
(-1.471) (-1.400) (2.463)
4PAYMENT -0.303 -0.383 -0.184
INCOME (-2.659) (-3.184) (-1.908)
5C0NCOST/P0.137 0.218 0.097 0.184
Atlanta (1.769) (1.251) (1.348) (2.976)
6CONCOST/Pb 0.168 0.357 0.168 0.201
Chicago (1.838) (2.117) (1.926) (2.869)
7C0NCOST/P. 0.247 0.286 0.174 0.288
Dallas (2.229) (2.233) (1.841) (3.543)
8CONCOST/Pb 0.258 0.132 0.243 0.300
San Fran (2.611) (1.095) (2.624) (3.628)
9sEMP 0.090 0.095
(%) (0.950) (1.020)
10 INCOME 0.548 0.407 0.468
(%) (2.330) (1.721) (1.982)
11 ACONCOST 0.051 0.022
(%) (0.363) (0.159)
12 iAGEPOP 0.013 0.015 0.015
(%) (1.779) (1.931) (2.262)
13 MTR -0.843 -0.914 -0:943
(%) (-1.439) (-1.530) (-1.522)
14 HSTARTS/POP-l4.079 -3.763
(-0.988) (-0.250)
0.559 0.582 0.536 0.109 0.281
Nobs 229 229 229 229 229
22Table 8
Regressions of Excess Return B (Leveraged) on Forecasting Variables
Dependent Variable is EXCESSfrom t+l to t+5
Ba
Regression No. 1 2(duinmied) 3 4 5
1Const 0.406 0.916 -0.312 -0.253 -0.839





3RENT -11.926 -10.345 8.072
(-2.384) (-1.848) (2.476)
4PAYMENT -1.838 -2.116 -1.250
INCOME (-4.220) (-4.600) (-3.147)
5CONCOST/Pb 0.711 1.178 0.312 0.884
Atlanta (2.041) (1.470) (0.943) (2.964)
6CONCOST7Pb 0.817 1.632 0.608 0.966
Chicago (2.007) (2.065) (1.527) (2.851)
7C0NCOST/P 1.316 1.632 0.645 1.394
Dallas (2.704) (2.065) (1.469) (3.557)
8CONCOST/Pb 1.301 1.574 0.991 1.452
San Fran (2.941) (2.673) (2.321) (3.645)
9EMP 0.650 0.634
(%) (1.535) (1.148)
10 MNCOME 1.963 1.366 1.447
(%) (2.053) (1.419) (1.410)
11 ACONCOST -0.025 -0.166
(%) (-0.043) (-0.286)
12 AAGEPOP 0.056 0.072 0.066
(%) (1.710) (2.084) (2.107)
13 AMTR -2.988 -3.660 -3.624
(%) (-1.379) (-1.647) (-1.423)
14 HSTARTS/POP-76.367 -19.963
(-1.180) (-0.294)
R2 0.615 0.640 0.571 0.109 0.284
Nobs 229 229 229 229 229Notes to Tables 6,7, and 8
Notes: EXCESSAand EXCESSBare from the expressions on page 9 using WRS
t÷lto t+5, aROW 2: WbtWbt4 is the lagged change in log priceusinga
price index b.EXCESSAk is from the expression on page 9 using WRSbt-4to
t.Row 3:RENT/Pb is he ratio of rent on homes at time t to the price of
homes at t.RENT, a measure of rent levels that is valid for comparison
across cities, is for each city qual to RENTINDEX*RENT7O/PRICE7O. P.,,,is
exp(WRSb) (the WRSpriceindex was in logs).Row 4:The variable PAMENT
is estimated mortgage payment divided by per capita personal income, time t.
Rows 5-8: CONCOST/Pb is a construction cost divided by price, time t.Since
the construction cost index is the same for all cities in the base year by
construction, it cannot be used for inter-city comparisons.Therefore, the
variable for each city appears multiplied by a dummy which is 1.00 only for
that city.Row 9: Percentage change in employment, t-4 to t, Row 10:
Percentage change in real per capita income between t-4 and t, Row 11:
percentage change in real construction costs, t-4 to t, Row 12: EACEPOP is
the percentage change in adult population (between ages of 25 and 44) t-4 to
t, Row 13: Percentage change in marginal tax rate t-4 to t, Row 14: Housing
starts, total for quarters t-4 through t divided by population at time t.
See Table 1 for sources of data.
T-statistics (in parentheses) take account of overlap of observations of
dependent variable and cross-section-time-series structure of data.Data
are quarterly starting in 1970, first quarter.Data end in 1986, second
quarter for each city except San Francisco, where data end in 1986, third
quarter.
The regression reported in Column 2 included as well city dununies for
Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas. (Their coefficients are not reported here.)
24forecast excess returns by definition A on page 9, and Table 8
uses them to forecast excess returns bydefinition B on page 9.
There was only modest improvement in theR2 for the price
changes, to about a third.The excess returns are more
forecastable since the real interest rate on the alternative
asset which is used to compute the excess return is fairly
forecastable.
Columns 1 and 2 in Tables 6,7, and 8 use all of our
forecasting variables as independent variables.Columns 3 and 4
drop some of the less significant variables to achieve asimpler
forecasting relation.Columns 5, and 6 show some extremely
simple forecasting relations.
The forecasting variables we consider include two that are
measures of fundamental value relative toprice:rent divided by
price and construction cost divided by price.These are
analogous to the dividend—price ratio that has been found to
forecast stock market returns (see for example Shiller [1989]and
Fama and French [1988)).When both of these are in the
regression together (columns 1 and 2) the rent divided by price
has the "wrong" sign, possibly reflectingmulticollinearity
problems.Thus, the rent divided by price was omitted from the
regression reported in column 3.However, rent divided by price
has a positive estimated coefficient (statisticallysignificant
in the excess returns regressions) in regressionswith it as the
only forecasting variable for price.
25The estimated mortgage payment divided by per capita
personal income variable is supposed to be an index of
affordability, reflecting the difficulty that people face in
carrying a mortgage.High values indicate that housing costs are
out of line with income.Thus, we expect this variable to be
negatively correlated with subsequent price changes.However, it
was not significant in the regressions with price change as the
dependent variable.It has the expected negative sign in the
regressions with excess returns as dependent variable, though
perhaps just because it is an interest-rate—related variable
which is correlated with the interest rate on the alternative
asset used to compute excess returns.
The change in employment and change in income variables had
the expected positive signs, high values of these indicators of
the strength of the economy portending price increases or high
excess returns.But the former was never statistically
significant, the latter only marginally so.
The change in construction cost variable was not
statistically significant.The change in the adult population
variable had a positive sign and was often significant.This
variable is related to one used by Mankiw and Weil [1989] to
predict housing prices in the United States.
Changes in the marginal income tax rate facing the marginal
buyer is an important variable, but its sign in these equations
is ambiguous ex ante.First, a decrease in marginal tax rate
actually increases the cost of owning since property taxes and
26mortgage interest payments are deductible.But most statutory
changes in marginal personal tax rates are accompanied with other
tax provisions that may change the attractiveness of owner
occupied housing relative to other assets.For example, the
marginal rate reductions in the 1986 Tax Reform Act were
accompanied by provisions that significantly curtailed the
ability of taxpayers to shelter income with passive losses making
home ownership one of the last commonly available "shelters."
Similarly, ERTA of 1981 contained lower marginal rates and a host
of provisions (ACRS, Safe Harbor Leasing, extension of the ITC,
etc.) that changed the relative attractiveness of other assets.
Finally, a cut in marginal rates may have an income effect; as
disposable income increases, so will the demand for housing.
The variableMTR has a negative coefficient and is mildly
significant in all equations.This indicates that the impact of
marginal tax rates on the after tax cost of housing seems to be
offset by other provisions.There is one other possible reason
for the negative sign.The largest cut in tax rates (1981) took
place at the same moment that interest rates were at extremely
high levels (21% prime in the summer of 1981).These very high
interest rates may have put sharp downward pressure on house
prices at exactly the same moment that ERTA was cutting marginal
rates.
Housing starts divided by population also has also the
expected negative sign.High housing starts represent new supply
27on line that will tend to depress prices with a lag.However,
the housing starts variable was not significant.
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